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PITFALLS IN THE TEXAS SECURITIES ACTt
by
Alfred Hill*
T HE recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Brown
v. Cole' has focused attention on the problem of unwitting
civil liability under the Texas Securities Act,' more commonly
known as the Blue Sky Law. In this case two investors in an unsuc-
cessful mining venture recovered their $10,000 investment in an
action brought under what is now Section 34 of the Act- the
first such action ever to reach the appellate courts.' The Court
conceded the result to be "harsh" and "inequitable," but declared
that the Act left it no alternative. The decision, which is more
fully discussed below, is of particular interest because of its bear-
ing on some common types of transactions which are consummated
each day in oblivion of the possibility that the provisions of the
Blue Sky Law may be applicable.4 This oblivion was seemingly
shared, in the case of his own transaction, by the defendant in
Brown v. Cole, although, as a person engaged in the securities
business, he was a member of the group which is presumably best
informed on the scope of the Blue Sky Law.
In general, securities must be qualified under this law if they
are sold by an "issuer ' or "dealer."'6 Sales by a private person
are in most instances excluded from the Act by the exemption for
tThe author acknowledges with appreciation assistance in the form of a research
grant from the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
*B.S., College of the City of New York; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School; former
attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission; former Executive Assistant to Chair-
man, S.E.C.; Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 ___Tex.--_ . . S.W.2d__ , (Tex. Sup. Ct. Reporter, March 31, 1956)
affirming 276 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
2 TE X. REv. CEv. STAT. (1925), art. 579. Prior to 1955, when the Securities Act
was amended in respects not relevant hereto, the Act was set forth in Art. 600a of
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) ; Brown v. Cole arose under Art. 600a. References to the
statute hereinafter are to the sections as they are presently numbered in Art. 579.
3 In Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref., the plain-
tiffs, alleging non-compliance with the Securities Act, employed a rescission action to
recover certain oil royalties that had been assigned to a promoter for pooling in a
corporation. At the time of this action the statute did not have a provision equivalent
to the present Section 34 which expressly grants a right of rescission for sales in
violation of the Act.
4 See, generally, Rain, Unintended Violations of the Texas Securities Act, THE
DALLAS BAR SPEAKs 102-110 (1952).
5 Sec. 2 (g).
6 Sec. 2 (c).
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sales "in the ordinary course of bona fide personal investment of
... personal holdings or change in such investment." 7 Many types
of securities are also specifically exempted from the operation
of the Act;' the regulatory features of the Act are aimed largely
at promotional securities and securities not sold on national
securities exchanges. In general, such securities, particularly where
new ventures are concerned, may not be sold unless a permit is
obtained from the Secretary of State, who may grant such a permit
only upon finding that the transaction will be "fair, just and
equitable"9 to the buyers.'" Failure of the seller to obtain a per-
mit gives the buyers a statutory right of rescission."
The same securities may also be subject to the registration pro-
visions of the Federal Securities Act 2 unless they are offered
exclusively intrastate or are exempt from the Federal Act on some
other ground.' It is to be noted that in one fundamental respect
the exemptive scheme of the Federal Act differs from that of the
State Act. Under the Federal Act, securities need not be registered
unless they are the subject of a "public offering."' 4 While the
scope of this concept is often not clear, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has long taken the view that an offering of securities
limited to twenty-five persons or less is a "private offering" and
therefore exempt, 5 and it has generally been assumed that per-
sons are safe in relying on this consistent administrative construc-
tion of the Federal Act.' 6 The Texas Act does not have a similar
exemption for "private offerings." The Texas Act has certain
exemptions based on number of sales rather than number of offers.
It may be possible under present law to have exempt status for an
indefinite number of offers, and in some circumstances for as many
as twenty-five actual sales. However, in some circumstances the
sale to one person of one share of stock may not be exempt.
7 Sec. 3(c). Some recent cases seem to hold broadly that any person who engages
in an isolated transaction is a "dealer" within the meaning of the Act, and subject to
certain statutory consequences if he fails to register as such. See note 27 inlra. And see
Sec. 30. However, in none of these cases did the persons involved sell securities they
were holding for personal investment, so the Sec. 3(c) exemption was unavailable to
them. Sec. 3(c) is so clearly intended to exempt every aspect of the sales described
therein that it is 'almost inconceivable that the Court would hold persons making such
sales of their own securities to be "dealers" within the meaning of the Act.
8 Sec. 4.
9 Sec. 8.
10 One of the principal amendments added in 1955 was a provision for registration
by notification for concerns which have been in continuous operation for not less than




Let us assume that a corporation organized under the laws of
Texas, and having forty stockholders, sells some of its shares to
one or two key employees who are not already stockholders, 7 but
who are thoroughly conversant with the business and need no pro-
tection from the Secretary of State. There is no exemption for this
transaction, and apparently it may be rescinded at will by the
buyers. The most nearly applicable exemptive provision exempts
sales by "any domestic corporation" only "so long as the total
number of stockholders and security holders of said corporation
does not and will not after such sale exceed twenty-five... ."" In
the above illustration, however, the corporation had more than
twenty-five security holders when the sale was made.
Or let it be assumed that a man owning mineral properties in
Texas or in some other state forms a Delaware corporation to which
he transfers such properties, and thereafter induces a financially
sophisticated and affluent Texan to participate in the venture
with him by purchasing a number of shares in the Delaware cor-
poration. A literal reading of the Act, or at least a literal first
reading, might again suggest the absence of an exemption, with the
result that the transaction could be consummated legally only if
permission is obtained from the Secretary of State upon a show-
ing that the proposition is inherently "fair" to the investing finan-
cier. In this instance there are less than twenty-five stockholders,
but the corporation is a Delaware corporation rather than a "do-
mestic" corporation. 9 Even if the securities are sold by the pro-
the securities of such concerns may be sold within five days after certain information
is filed with the Secretary of State. See Sec. 5(b).
11 Sec. 34. See note 27, infra.
12 See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 120 et seq. (1951, with 1955 Supp.).
18 Id. at 351 et seq.
14 Id. at 394-400.
15 MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT 101 (1948) ; Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 186 n. 321d (1955 Supp.)
16 But cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). Concerning this
case see Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 185-88 (1955 Supp.)
17 Under Section 3 (e) there is an exemption, under certain conditions, for sales
by a corporation to persons who are already stockholders.
18 Sec. 3 (j).
19 It is arguable that the term "domestic corporation" means one organized under
the laws of any of the United States, as distinct from a corporation organized under
the laws of a foreign country. The point can be made that when the legislators meant
to designate a corporation organized under the laws of Texas they specifically referred
to it as a "Texas corporation," as in Sec. 3(1). Cf. Sec. 3(h) with Sec. 3(o).
On the other hand it is understood that the Secretary of State has taken the view
19561
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moter out of his own holdings, instead of directly by the corpora-
tion, this fact would not of itself exempt the transaction, for it is
being assumed that the money is raised as an incident of the plan
to finance the development of the mineral properties, and the stat-
ute provides that a sale by a private vendor is not exempt when
intended directly or indirectly for the benefit of an issuer.20 But
even if a sale has taken place within the ordinary meaning of that
word, and perhaps even within the meaning of the word as defined
in the Act if such definition is read literally, there remains the
possibility that there has not been a sale within the meaning of the
Act read as a whole and in the light of the obvious legislative
intent. This is a problem to which Brown v. Cole is particularly
relevant, as will be seen below.
Again, there are serious questions concerning the legal status
under the Blue Sky Law of many types of unincorporated oil and
gas ventures. In a typical promotion, one person or a small syndi-
cate will acquire an entire working interest and will thereafter
sell fractional undivided portions to others while keeping a major
or principal portion. Often these fractional undivided interests
will be sold to personal friends and business acquaintances directly
rather than through the intermediation of professional brokers.
One of the persons who has been induced to buy -say, a Mr.
Smith - may recommend the investment to several others, who in
turn buy on the basis of his description of it; possibly he may
agree to hold a 1/32 undivided interest for the benefit of the
others in his group. Even in the case of a fairly small oil or gas
lease, the number of persons who become co-owners of the work-
ing interest in this manner may be fairly substantial.
Have there been transactions in securities? Apparently so, for
the Blue Sky Law defines securities as including, inter alia, "any
interest in or under an oil, gas or mining lease, fee or title."
21
that the term "domestic corporation" means a corporation organized under Texas law,
which is, of course, a view more consistent with the ordinary usage of the term.
Cf. Meer, Oil Finance and the Securities Laws, 29 TEx. L. REv. 885, 899 (1951);
Rain, Unintended Violations of the Texas Securities Act, THE DALLAS BAR SP.AKS 102,
108-09 (1952).
20 Sec. 3(c). Thus the exemption would probably be unavoidable if the proceeds
are loaned to the corporation or used to purchase stock from the corporation.
21 Sec. 2(a). See Meer, op. cit. supra note 19; Comment, The Texas Securities Act
As It Applies to Interests in Oil and Gas, 22 TFx. L. REv. 346 (1944). Cf. Bloomenthal,
SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Financing, 7 Wyo. L.J. 49 (1953) ; Comment, Oil and Gas
Interests as "Securities," 26 CALIF. L. REv. 359 (1938).
[Vol. 10
SALE OF SECURITIES
Insofar as the original promoters are concerned, their activities,
if pursued on a sufficiently large scale, seem clearly within the
intended scope of such legislation, for in effect they are soliciting
others to invest their money in a common enterprise and to look for
their profits to the efforts of the promoters in developing produc-
tion." The most nearly relevant exemption excludes from the oper-
ation of the Act "the sale of an interest in any partnership, pool,
or other company, not a corporation, the total membership of
which does not and will not after such sale exceed ten.... 23 But
it is common knowledge that such persons often do exceed ten in
number, and that such promotions are virtually never qualified
under the Blue Sky Law. 4 The original promoters, at least, would
seem to be particularly vulnerable to a rescission action under
the statute.
Is Mr. Smith of the foregoing illustration similarly vulnerable
on the theory that he "sold" securities within the meaning of the
Act? One of the most difficult questions under the Act is when
in fact does a sale take place. Thus a syndicate of twelve men may
be organized to invest in an oil venture, all of them sharing equally
in profits and losses and in control. The statutory exemption for
unincorporated enterprises is unavailable, for more than ten
participants are involved. Their participations, however evidenced,
may be securities; but have securities been sold within the meaning
of the Act?25
BROWN V. COLE
This fundamental question-what is a sale-was the principal
issue before the Supreme Court of Texas in Brown v. Cole. A
Mexican mining enterprise being in need of additional working
capital, one of its representatives proposed to some Dallasites a
plan of financing which, as it ultimately took shape, involved a
$30,000 loan to be repaid "as promptly as is advisable," ap-
parently with interest of five per cent. The lenders were also to
receive, without further cost, a one-fourth interest in the mining
22 Cf. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).2S Sec. 3(k).
24 See Meer, op. cit. supra note 19, at 897.
125 "The terms 'sale' or 'offer for sale' or 'sell' shall include every disposition, or
attempt to dispose of a security for value.... The term 'sell' means any act by which
a sale is made...." Sec. 2(e).
1956]
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property. The one-fourth interest, consisting of stock in a Mexican
corporation, was to be transferred to another Mexican corporation
to be organized, and the lenders in turn were to receive the stock
of the latter corporation.
This financing proposal, or an earlier form of it, had been sub-
mitted to Brown and his employer, and a small group was formed
to participate in the financing. How this group was organized is
not clear, except that it appears Brown was at least partially instru-
mental in its formation. In the case of the co-plaintiffs Gould and
Cole, it is clear that Brown brought the matter to their attention,26
repeatedly procured additional information for them when they
asked for it, and advanced money, without any arrangement for
reimbursement, to finance a trip made by himself and Cole's aud-
itor to inspect the mining premises in Mexico. Brown also collected
money from the various members of the group for transmission
to Mexico and gave them receipts in which he represented himself
to be their agent for the transmission of the funds.
For doing these things Brown apparently received no special
compensation either from the Mexican interests or from the Dallas
group. Together with a partner he made a personal investment in
the enterprise of $5,000. Gould and Cole invested $5,000 each.
As stated in the Supreme Court's opinion, these two persons "did
not rely on any statements made to them by Brown, but, on the
contrary, conducted their own investigation, through their own
auditor, and relied solely on the auditor's report." When the
venture turned out to be a total loss, Gould and Cole brought a
rescission action against Brown under what is now Section 34 of
the Act for the recovery of their $5,000 investments.27 They were
26 Cole first learned of the proposition from Gould, who had learned of it from
Brown. Thereafter Brown dealt directly with Cole's auditor, and under the circum-
stances the Court held it to be immaterial that Cole's initial contact had been with Gould.
27 Then and now this provision (formerly Sec. 33a) gave a right of rescission for
every sale "made in violation of any provision" of the Securities Act. The plaintiffs
contended that there had been a violation not only in the failure to obtain a permit
for sale of the securities, but also in the failure of Brown to obtain a separate license
to act as a "dealer" in securities.
The question whether Brown was a "dealer" within the meaning of that Act was
not an issue in the case, and the result would have been the same had the point not
been decided at all. Hence it would seem that the discussion of this subject in Brown
v. Cole has little precedential value if any.
Apart from the rescission provisions of See. 34, the Act provides in Sec. 35 that a
"dealer" may. not maintain an action for commissions unless he has previously obtained
a license. Most of the private litigation involving the Act has arisen under See. 35,
see Cox, The Securities Act, in 2 VERNON'S ANNOTATED CIVIL STATUTES xii, XXV,
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sustained by each of the courts which considered the matter, al-
though Justice Smith entered a lone dissent from the decision of
the Supreme Court.
Brown's principal defense was that he had not made sales to
the members of the Dallas group. His claim was that they were all
co-purchasers together, and that he had simply acted as the agent
for the others in compiling information and in collecting and
transmitting the funds. The Mexican interests, he maintained, had
"sold" the securities. This latter proposition was conceded by the
Supreme Court to be correct, but the Court stated that other per-
sons might also be sellers if they constituted "any link of the chain
of the selling process." Noting that the Act defines "sale" as includ-
ing, inter alia, "any act by which a sale is made,"2 the Court con-
xxvi, and here also harsh penalties have been invoked in some cases of seemingly
unwitting violations. Section 2(c) of the Act defines a "dealer" as "every person or
company, other than a salesman, who engages in this state, either for all or part of
his or its time . . . in selling ... securities." It is arguable that (with certain exceptions
not relevant here) the legislature did not intend to require licenses except in the case of
persons engaged in the business of selling securities, at least on a part-time basis, and
apparently some of the lower courts have taken this view. Cf. Culver v. Cockburn, 127
S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dismissed, judgm. corr.; Anderson v. Breed-
ing, 250 S.W. 2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), rev'd., 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d 377 (1953).
However, in Cosner v. Hancock, 149 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dismissed,judgrn. corr., where the person seeking commissions was a tax auditor who had acted as
selling agent in only a single transaction, the Court held he was a dealer within the
meaning of the Act; the curious rationale of this decision was that to construe the
statute as requiring a license on the part of one who sells securities as a business while
not requiring it on the part of one who engages in a single transaction "would cause
the law to apply unequally and unfairly."
Subsequently, in Gregory v. Roedenbeck, 141 Tex. 543, 174 S.W.2d 585 (1943), the
Supreme Court held that isolated sales constituted one a dealer within the meaning
of the Real Estate Dealers' License Act. This Act compelled such a result in language
that expressly dealt with the problem and left no room for doubt, as the Court pointed
out; but the Court also cited, with apparent approval, the Court of Civil Appeals'
decision in Cosner v. Hancock. In 1953, in Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254
S.W.2d 377, 380, the Supreme Court, with virtually no discussion, held that a single trans-
action constituted the plaintiff a "dealer" within the meaning of the Texas Securities
Act. The cases relied upon were Gregory v. Roedenbeck, supra, and Cosner v. Han-
cock, supra. The most recent development came in Mecom v. Hamblen, 289 S.W.2d 553
(Tex. Sup. Ct. 1956) where the Court emphasized that the unlicensed dealers to whom
it was denying commissions had been regularly engaged in the lease brokerage business;
earlier cases were not cited on this question.
28 See note 25 supra. If Brown acted, as he claimed, for the syndicate, then he was
a purchaser rather than a seller. If he acted for the vendors, then presumably he was
a selling agent, and there is no doubt that a selling agent may himself be deemed a
seller who is liable in damages under the Blue Sky laws. Cf. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d
988 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 705 (1940) ; Loss, op. cit. supra note 12, at
1006. But even the question of the capacity in which Brown acted cannot be determined
for purposes of the present case except in the light of the fundamental aims of the Act.
Thus, a person who may be an agent for the buyer under familiar principles of agency
law, and who in fact is not acting as agent for anyone else, may in certain circumstances
be deemed to be selling to the buyer within the meaning of the statutory language. See
Loss, supra, at 1006-07.
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cluded that Brown's activities fell within this definition.
Although the Securities Act is silent respecting joint adventures,
the Court declared broadly that "the Act does not apply to a joint
adventurer and to transactions between joint adventurers."29 The
Court concluded, however, that "the elements of joint adventure
are not present in this case": first, because the participants
were free to sell their stock at will with the result that each might
"realize a profit in varying amounts;" and second, because "there
was no joint control of the enterprise," control being vested en-
tirely in the original Mexican group. It is difficult to see why the
possibility of realizing profits in varying amounts at various times
was thought to impair the status of the syndicate as a joint adven-
ture. Thus the most salient characteristic of the so-called "mining
partnership," which resembles the joint adventure more than it
does the partnership, is that the members are free to assign their
interests at will,"° and it would seem possible to provide by contract
for free assignability in any type of partnership. As to the issue
of joint control, it appears that there was joint control in the legal
sense, if not with respect to the mining venture as a whole, then
with respect to the lending syndicate. While Brown played an
active part in the organization of the latter, the more passive
members of the syndicate evidently had the same "power of ulti-
mate control"31 that suffices in establishing the ordinary partner-
ship relationship. The point seems to have been overlooked that
a joint adventure may exist as part of a larger enterprise." More-
over, there may well have been joint control even with respect
to the larger enterprise; for the members of the syndicate were to
receive one-fourth of the stock of the mining corporation, and if
this was voting stock"3 the assumed requirement of joint control
was apparently satisfied. Joint control means participation in
control, which may of course fall short of domination.
29 Ct. Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146 (1947).
30 See CRANE, HANDBOOK ON TIE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 121-23 (2nd ed. 1952).
Also see Jones, Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEx. L. REv. 410 (1934).
31 See CRANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 62-63 (2nd ed. 1952), quot-
ing from the Notes of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to Section 7 of the
UN1FORM PARTNERSHIP AcT.
32 Cf. Rowley, Risk Evasion Through Subpartnership, 30 COL. L. REV. 674 (1930).
33 It has been recognized that, from the point of view of the Blue Sky Laws, a busi.
ness enterprise may be a joint adventure even though it has been incorporated.
[Vol. 10
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THE JOINT ADVENTURE THEORY
The aspect of Brown v. Cole which is of special interest here
is the fact that, in its general approach to the concepts of "sale"
and "joint adventure," the Supreme Court seems to have taken a
view which may yield unfortunate results if applied in future
cases and which is not at all compelled by the Blue Sky Law. To
begin with, not every transaction between joint adventurers should
be deemed exempt under the Act. A joint adventure may be under-
taken by a large number of small unsophisticated adventurers
who have been brought together into a common enterprise by a
promoter who is himself a co-adventurer and who would certainly
be held to the fiduciary duties of a co-adventurer. This is, of
course, the very type of situation the Blue Sky Law is intended to
regulate,84 and there is no reason to believe that the Court would
rule otherwise if such facts presented themselves.
On the other hand, even where one person actively induces others
to participate with him in a joint adventure (it may be assumed
that the "participations" are securities within the meaning of the
Act), it does not follow that there has been a "sale" in the statutory
sense. Thus, if A and B are engaged in the lumber business and
seek additional capital from C, the latter agreeing to supply the
cash in return for a one-third interest in the business in the form
of stock in a corporation to be formed, it does not follow that A
and B have "sold" stock or a stock subscription to C. This essen-
tially was the holding in a recent California case,35 the Court
stating that "there appears no more reason for defendants to
reimburse the plaintiff for his contribution to the venture than for
plaintiff to reimburse defendants for theirs." 6 Similar decisions"
34Cf. Smith v. Fishback, 123 S.W.2d 771, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error ref.
("... we believe it can be safely said that no state in the Union has offered a richer field
for stock promoters and the sale of worthless stock and securities than has Texas"). Also
see Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 500-01, 143 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1940) ; SEC v. C. M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946).
35 Holmberg v. Marsden, 39 Cal.2d 592, 248 P.2d 417 (1952). As an illustration of
the dangers of holding that participations in a joint adventure are in all circumstances
exempt, see Hathaway v. Porter Royalty Pool, Inc., 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571 (1941).
Also see Oakley v. Rosen, 76 Cal. App. 2d 310, 173 P.2d 55 (1946), where the court
warns against use of the joint adventure as a subterfuge for evading the Blue Sky Law.
36 248 P.2d at 420.
87 See Lindemulder v. Shoup, 258 Mich. 679, 242 N.W. 807 (1932) ; Polk v. Chandler,
276 Mich. 527, 268 N.W. 732 (1936). For a similar case in California, see Oakley v.
Rosen, supra note 35.
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have been rendered by other courts, some cases resting on the
theory that the instruments involved were not really "securities"
within the meaning of the local Blue Sky Laws.8" Even where such
transactions may appear to involve "sales" of "securities" insofar
as their form is concerned, in substance the transaction may repre-
sent the formation of a joint adventure of a kind that could not
have been within the intended reach of the several state legislatures
when they adopted their securities statutes. The courts of some
states have so held, as the Texas Supreme Court is evidently pre-
pared to so hold, even in the face of legislative silence on a pos-
sible joint adventure exemption.39 The pertinent provision of the
California statute exempting "any bona fide joint adventure
interest, except such interests when offered to the public"' is one
which may fairly be said to be implicit in the scheme of the Blue
Sky Laws generally.
It is to be emphasized that the fundamental problem is one of
determining and effectuating legislative intent, and that concepts
of the joint adventure which are valid in other legal contexts are
not necessarily relevant in the context of the Blue Sky Laws.
Apparently a creature of the American courts, the joint adventure
has evolved in large measure as a device for fastening upon per-
sons the duties and liabilities of partners in situations where there
is really no partnership in the traditional sense of co-ownership
38 Cf. Austin v. Hallmark Oil Co., 21 Cal.2d 718, 134 P.2d 777, 782-83 (1943) ; Mac-
Donald v. Jackson, 117 Cal. App.2d 598, 556 P.2d 591, 595 (1953). Also see the opinion
of the Attorney General of Louisiana of Jan. 7, 1947, summarized in CCH BLUE SKY
LAW REPORTER 1631.041. And see Hammer v. Sanders, 61 Ill. App.2d 346, 127 N.E.2d
492, 499 (1955), affd in part and rev'd in part, Hammer v. Sanders, .,
134 N.E.2d 509 (1956). (The Supreme Court did not discuss the possibility of a joint
adventure exemption; in holding certain investment interests to be securities the Court
was not necessarily repudiating the theory of such an exemption, since, for reasons
stated at pp. 272, 273, supra, interests in a joint adventure should be deemed securities
in appropriate circumstances).
39 The Illinois statute involved in Hammer v. Sanders, supra note 38, does not have
such a statutory exemption. Cf. ILLINOIS SECURITIES LAW OF 1953, as amended, Sec. 4,
CCH BLUE SKY LAW REPORTER 11 16204. The Michigan cases cited in note 37 supra
were apparently decided before the present express exemption for joint adventures
(where there are not more than 25 participants) was added to the Michigan statute.
Cf. COMPILED LAWS OF MICHIGAN, 1948, as amended, Sec. 451.105(j), CCH BLUE SKY
LAW REPORTER 25105. Similarly, the opinion by the Louisiana Attorney General
referred to in note 38 supra was rendered without the benefit of an express statutory
exemption. Cf. LOUISIANA REv. STAT. OF 1950, Sec. 51.705, CCH BLUE SKY LAW
REPORTER 21.105.
40 See Sec. 25100(m) of CALIF. CORP. CODE, CCH BLUE SKY LAW REPORTER T 8221.
[Vol. 10
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of a business for profit.41 If there is uncertainty concerning the
critical elements needed to constitute a partnership, the uncertainty
is compounded in the case of the newer and more variegated joint
adventure.
Justice Smith, in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. Cole, indi-
cated that the majority's emphasis on mutuality of control as an
indispensable aspect of the joint adventure stemmed from reliance
on the so-called joint enterprise cases in the field of torts. It has
become familiar doctrine that if A and B and C, having a common
destination, take a car on a long trip pursuant to an agreement to
share expenses, and injury is caused through the negligent driving
of A, occupants B and C will not be allowed to recover from A,
and indeed may themselves be liable to strangers injured in the
accident.42 Usually the three occupants of the car are said to have
been parties to a "joint enterprise,"4 although the term "joint
adventure" is used by some courts;" in any event joint control is
of the essence in these cases, and profit-sharing is usually entirely
absent. On the other hand, in the leading case of Meinhard v.
Salmon,45 a person having exclusive control over a real estate
venture was charged with fiduciary responsibility toward a person
who shared in the profits of the venture, largely because control
was in fact exclusively vested in the one and not in the other;46 in
this instance the theory of the joint adventure was employed to
justify the imposition of a fiduciary obligation. The theory of the
joint adventure is often put to another use, although perhaps not
in Texas,47 when it is invoked to validate a joint undertaking by
two or more corporations. As thus employed it serves largely as
a fiction giving legal sanction to a common type of business ar-
rangement which would otherwise be under a legal cloud because
of the traditional rule that a corporation may not be a member
41 See Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. LAW REv. 644 (1931) ;
Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425 (1950) ; Comment, The Joint Venture:
Problem Child of Partnership, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 860 (1950).
42 PROSSEra, TORTS 363-67 (2nd ed. 1955).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Washington & O.D. Ry. v. Zell's Adm'x, 118 Va. 755, 88 S.E. 309, 312
(1916) ; Johnson v. Fischer, 292 Mich. 78, 290 N.W. 334, 336 (1940).
45 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
46 Also see Nichols, op cit. supra note 41, at 439. CI. Oakley v. Rosen, 76 Cal.
App.2d 310, 173 P.2d 55 (1946) (one of several co-adventures given complete charge of
production of play).




of a partnership.4" In each of these instances the so-called joint
adventure serves a different purpose and displays different
characteristics.
Special complications are presented by practices in the oil and
gas business. The persons owning undivided fractional interests in
a lease typically execute an operating agreement which vests con-
trol of development, although not necessarily exclusive control, in
an "operator," usually one of their number, and which provides
that the several parties are to contribute to expenses and are to
share in the profits in proportion to their ownership in the lease. 9
The vesting of operating responsibility in one of the co-owners is
not inconsistent with the existence of a partnership; in fact it is
a common characteristic of the so-called mining partnership." In
an effort to save the non-operators from partnership liability, the
attorneys who draft these operating agreements commonly insert
provisions thought to be inconsistent with the relationship of part-
nership or joint adventure-provisions such as express disclaimers
of intent to form a partnership and provisions designed to avoid
the semblance of co-ownership.5' Other provisions which may have
similar tendencies, such as those governing the right of each co-
owner to take his share of the production in kind or the right to
market it or direct its sale, are dictated primarily, it seems, by
tax considerations. 2 Even if such provisions negate the existence
of a mining partnership or joint adventure for some purposes-
and their efficacy in this direction is far from certain 5-it does
not follow that they are relevant to the purposes of the Texas
Securities Act.
The crucial problem in Brown v. Cole was whether the defendant
had "sold" securities to the plaintiffs within the meaning of the
Act. The theory of the joint adventure was significant only as an
analytical tool in seeking a solution to this problem. As an analyti-
48 See annotation, 80 A.L.R. 1049 (1932).
49 See Shepherd, Problems Incident to Joint Ownership of the Oil and Gas Lease-
hold Estate, FIFrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 215, 233-57
(Southwestern Legal Foundation 1954).
50 See annotation, 24 A.L.R.2d 1359 (1952).
51 See Shepherd, op. cit supra note 49; 3 STAYTON'S ANNOTATED TEXAS FORMS,
Sec. 4173 (1954 pocket part).
52 See Jones, Problems Presented by Joint Ownership of Oil, Gas and Other Min-
erals, 32 TEX. L. REv. 697, 720 (1954).
" See Jones, op. cit. supra note 52 at 717-21; Shepherd, op. cit. supra note 49. Cf.
Jones, Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEX. L. REv. 410 (1934).
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cal tool it was useful only to the degree that the Court was prepared
to give paramount consideration to the rationally inferrable inten-
tion of the legislature as revealed in the statute being construed.
It was not useful insofar as it opened the door to consideration of
the supposed attributes of the joint adventure in irrelevant legal
contexts.
SELLING ACTIVITY
As previously noted, the Court construed the Securities Act's
definition of "sale" - "any act by which a sale is made" - as
encompassing "any link of the chain of the selling process."
Undoubtedly the Court did not intend to include the secretary who
types a soliciting letter for the seller. But what about the investor
who, enthusiastic over a recent purchase, recommends the same in-
vestment to his friends and puts them in touch with the salesman?
Is this hapless investor also to be liable in an action in rescission?
The Supreme Court construed certain Michigan cases as reaching
such a result, although analysis of these cases raises serious ques-
tions concerning the Court's interpretation of them. 4 Whether
or not the Court was influenced by what it conceived the Michigan
rule to be, the Court did state that Brown had "displayed consid-
erably more salesmanship activity than was shown in the Michigan
cases." In this connection the Court pointed out that in addition
to initiating the matter with Gould and Cole, Brown had repeatedly
taken steps to obtain more information for them. Most significant,
perhaps, in the view of the Court was the fact that, without any
agreement for reimbursement, Brown had made an outlay of
$1,200 in taking Cole's auditor on an inspection trip to Mexico -
an unusual expenditure when it is considered that Brown's total
personal investment (with a partner) was only $5,000.
It is, of course, rare that a joint adventure is conceived spon-
taneously in the minds of the several participants; inevitably, some
54 In Chambers v. Beckwith, 247 Mich. 255, 225 N.W. 605 (1929), the selling agent,
far from being an innocent fellow investor, turned out to be the president of the issu-
ing company, and there was evidence that he had personally guaranteed the buyer
against loss. In Thompson v. Cain, 226 Mich. 609, 198 N.W. 249 (1924), the holding
was only that the trial court had erred in charging the jury that the selling agent was
to be exonerated unless it was shown (1) that he had profited by the transaction and
(2) that his interest in the transaction was similar to that of the seller. In Lewis v.
Bricker, 235 Mich. 656, 209 N.W. 832 (1926), the holding was that there was error
in charging the jury that the selling agent was to be exonerated unless it was shown
that the sale would not have been made but for his efforts.
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are more active than others in the promotion and organization of
such enterprises. Since the Court was ready to exonerate Brown
upon finding that a true joint adventure existed, it would follow
that what the Court called "salesmanship activity" need not in all
circumstances be regarded as "selling" within the meaning of the
Act.55
In the syndicate which Brown was partly instrumental in form-
ing, he was himself a participant on terms of equality with the
others; it does not appear that he received special compensation or
consideration of any kind from the operators of the mining busi-
ness. If his zeal was such that, as the Court said, Gould and Cole
would not have participated "but for Brown's activities and re-
peated efforts," the same zeal apparently would have been con-
doned by the Court had the syndicate been formed to operate a
business rather than, as the Court viewed it, to lend money to others
who were operating a business. The distinction, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, does not appear to the writer to be a sig-
nificant one from the point of view of the purposes of the Securities
Act.
CONCLUSION
The Blue Sky Laws of the several states were adopted to pre-
vent unscrupulous promoters from selling unsuspecting investors
55 Section 3 (k), as previously observed, exempts the sale of an interest in an unin-
corporated venture "the total membership of which does not and will not after such sale
exceed ten," provided that the organization expenses do not exceed two percent. This
exemption was held unavailable to Brown because be bad "sold" interests in a corpora-
tion, and because in any event he had not sustained the burden of proof of showing that
the other conditions of the exemption were met. If all the conditions of Section 3 (k) are
satisfied there may, of course, be exempt selling activity by the terms of the section itself.
But if there has been no "sale" within the meaning of the Act, there is no need to find
a specific exemption in the Act. Hence promotional activity in the interest of the organ-
ization of a true joint adventure (whatever that may be) would seem to be exempt even
though the number of participants exceeds ten and the organizational expenses exceed
two per cent, and even if a corporation is involved.
In 1945 the Attorney General of Texas rendered an opinion which is seemingly incon-
sistent with this view. Op. No. 0-6457. Section 3 (1) of the Act exempts the sale of stock
subscriptions to a proposed Texas corporation where the number of subscribers does
not exceed fifteen. This exemption was inapplicable to the case before the Attorney
General, which involved pre-incorporation subscriptions by thirty persons. The incor-
porators contended, however, that there had not been any "sale" within the meaning
of the Act, apparently on the theory that the participants had banded together as joint
adventurers to organize a quasi-civic water supply company. This view was rejected by
the Attorney General without regard to the circumstances which attended the organ-




so many feet of "blue sky.""6 Regulation of the sale of what are
popularly understood to be stocks and bonds is not enough, for
there are an infinite variety of get-rich-quick schemes by which
ordinary people can be induced to place their money in an invest-
ment pool in the hope of profit through the management efforts
of a third person. The Blue Sky Laws of the several states, includ-
ing the Texas Securities Act, are broadly framed, particularly in
their definitions, to encompass all these diverse possibilities.57
These broad definitions should not be permitted to become traps
for the unwary.
While the result in Brown v. Cole, labeled by the Court itself
as "harsh" and "inequitable," seems to have been unnecessary,
the declared readiness of the Court to find an implied exemption
for activity incidental to the organization of a joint adventure
marks a step in the right direction. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that the theory of the joint adventure is useful only as a
tool in determining whether there has been a sale of securities
within the meaning of the Act. A promotion in which relatively
small participations are sold to scattered investors with meager
resources of investigation and financial comprehension may be a
joint adventure for many legal purposes, but it is the very sort
of thing the Blue Sky Law was designed to regulate. The need for
such regulation, it may be added, is particularly strong in the
highly speculative oil and gas business.5"
On the other hand, a promotion in which the parties are essen-
tially equals who can, if they wish, and as they often do, make an
effective investigation, is one in which, by hypothesis, no one needs
the protection of an overworked state official. Promotions of this
character necessarily involve only a small number of investors.
A private offering exemption, such as is embodied in the Federal
Securities Act, would effectively exclude most if not all such pro-
motions from the scope of the Texas Securities Act. In general the
state Blue Sky Laws are similar to that of Texas in not having a
general private offering exemption.59 This has resulted, in various
states, in holdings that what might otherwise be securities and sales
58 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 550 (1917).
57 Cf. Loss, SECURITiEs REGULATION 318-29 (1951, with 1955 Supp.).
58 See note 34 supra. Cf. Warren, Transfer of the Oil and Gas Lessee's Interest, 34
Tbx. L. REv. 386, 389-90 (1956).
59 Cf. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 43 (1951, with 1955 Supp.).
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were not "securities" and "sales" within the meaning of the sev-
eral laws.6 Even where, as sometimes happens, such an approach
requires a strained construction of the law, it is preferable to one
which yields "harsh" and "inequitable" results that could not
possibly have been within the contemplation of the state legisla-
tures. The opinion in Brown v. Cole reveals a readiness to follow
the path of legislative intent, and there is ample basis in the opin-
ion for limitation of the actual holding to the peculiar facts
presented by the case.
6 0 See notes 37, 38 supra.
